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PACS in Kentucky: Regulating the
Permanent Committees
INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, public attention at the national and state levels

has focused on the ways political candidates finance their canpaigns for public office.' Among the proposals for reforming
campaign financing systems are those that focus on the activities

2
of political action committees, commonly referred to as PACs.
Like other proposed reforms to campaign finance laws, those

focusing on PACs have generated vigorous debate over the need

for further regulations restricting PACs' role in funding political
campaigns. 3 Additionally, restrictions on political participation
by any individual or group raise tough first amendment ques4
tions.

1 See, e.g., Haughee, The Florida Election Campaign Financing Act: A Bold
Approach to Public Financing of Elections, 14 FiA. ST. U.L. Rav 585, 589-90 nn.2733 (1986). For some recent examnnations of Kentucky's campaign finance laws see
Dunlop, Winning at Any Cost: How Money PoisonsKentucky's Elections, The CourierJournal (Louisville), Oct. 11-18, 1987 (an eight-part series on money and politics in
Kentucky); Cap Campaign Spending, The Courier-Journal (Louisville), June 11, 1987,
at A8, col. 1; Legislature Should Outlaw Post-Election Fund-Raisers,Lexington HeraldLeader, Dec. 22, 1986, at A16, col. 1; Public Financing Would Curb Costs of GubernatorialRaces, The Courier-Journal (Louisville), Apr. 17, 1979, at A6, col. 1.
2 This Note uses the generic term "PAC" to include all political committees
organized to participate in political campaigns but not created by candidates or political
parties. Primarily, this Note focuses on PACs organized to support candidates for
political office on a continuing basis.
I See Symposium on Political Action Committees and Campaign Finance, 22
Aiuz. L. R-v. 351 (1980). Compare Chiles, PACs: Congress on the Auction Block, J.
LEais. 193, 217 (1984) ("If
money, through the vehicle of political action committees, is undermining [Congress'] role as the people's representative, action should be
taken.") (1984) with Leatherberry, The Dangers of Reform: A Comment on Senator
Chiles' Position on PACs, 12 J. LEGIs. 43, 53 (1985) ("Maintenance of the status quo
is preferable to the problems which would likely be caused by major reform proposals.").
4 See infra notes 130-248 and accompanying text.
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PACs, known as "permanent committees" under Kentucky

6
law, 5 are currently objects of concern in the Commonwealth.

Prior to the legislative session of 1988, proponents for reforming
Kentucky's campaign finance laws urged the Legislature to amend

existing laws regulating PACs to limit their participation in
Kentucky's elective system. 7 Swept up by the election reform

fervor of the day, the Legislature responded by making significant changes in the way PACs may function in the Common8
wealth.
This Note addresses some of the issues that the Kentucky
Legislature must consider before imposing further restraints on
the political activities of PACs. It also outlines some of the

issues that Kentucky courts may face if PACs challenge the
constitutionality of restrictions placed on their political activities

in 1988. The first section traces the evolution of PACs as major
political players at the national and state levels. 9 The second
section outlines Kentucky's current regulations on PAC activi-

ties.' 0 This section also examines the arguments for and against
limiting PACs' participation in financing political campaigns.
The third section considers the first amendment questions implicated by legislative restraints on PACs.12 Finally, the fourth
section suggests proposals for confronting the problems likely to

arise from enforcement of the current regulatory scheme.3

Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 121.015(3)(c) (Baldwin 1986) [hereinafter KRS] defines
a permanent committee as:
A group of individuals, including an association, committee or organization, other than a campaign committee or party executive committee, which
is established as, or intended to be, a permanent organization having as a
primary purpose political activity which may include support of or opposition to selected candidates, political parties, or issues of public importance, and which functions on a regular basis throughout the year.
6 See, e.g., Dunlop, Unrestrained, PACs Enjoy Growing Clout, The CourierJournal (Louisville), Oct. 16, 1987, at Al, col 3; Ravages of Corruption (6), The
Courier-Journal (Louisville), Oct. 16, 1987, at A10, col. I; Law Should Be Amended to
Put Controls on PACs, Ashland Independent, July 19, 1987, at 12, col. 1; Kentucky
Must Curb PACs, The Couner-Journal (Louisville), July 21, 1987, at A6, col. 1.
Id., COMMON CAUSE/KENTUCKY PAC STuDY (1987).
8 See S.B. 53; S.B. 268.
9 See infra notes 14-62 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 63-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 99-129 and accompanying text.
,2 See infra notes 130-248 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 249-78 and accompanying text.
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PAC BEGINNINGS

PACs at the National Level

PACs have participated in American political campaigns for
more than forty years, notwithstanding the recent attention focused on them. Labor unions created the first PACs at the end
of World War II to circumvent federal legislation prohibiting
them from making campaign contributions to candidates for
federal office. 14 During the 1950s and 1960s, umon-affiliated
PACs represented the majority of those in operation, but business, professional, and ideological groups steadily increased their
use of PACs in tins period.' 5 Although corporate PACs were
rare prior to the 1970s, corporations employed various other
methods to circumvent federal and state restrictions on their
6
political activities.1

14 The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 (Smith-Connally Act) imposed the initial
restrictions on political contributions by umons. ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163, 167 (1943)
(repealed Sept. 1, 1947). The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act) made the restnctions permanent. ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed by Pub. L. 94-283, Title II, § 201(a), May 11,
1976, 90 Stat. 496).
See Pipefitters Local Umon No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 402-09 (1972)
(reviewed legislative history of Acts and start of CIO's first PAQ; H. ALEXANDER,
FnJANCINo PoLTmcs: MONEY, ELECTIONs AND POLITICAL REFORM 105, 133 (1976). A.

MATASuR, CORPORATE PACs AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCINO LAws: USE OR ABUSE

OF POWER? 8-10 (1986); L. SABATo, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL
ACTION CommIT=EFs 5-6 (1984).
1
IsHerbert Alexander, a well-respected commentator on campaign finances, noted
in his study of the 1964 presidential campaigns that "miscellaneous committees" (all
committees other than those affiliated with umons) increased in number from mneteen
in 1960, to twenty-sx in 1964. This is not a shocking increase, but the increase in
expenditures attributed to those committees is significant. They reported $850,000 in
total disbursements in 1960, compared to $1,963,000 in total disbursements for 1964.
H. ALEXANDER, FnANCING THE 1964 ELECTION 63-66 (1966). Two new PACs contributing
to this sharp increase-the American Medical Political Action Committee (AMPAC) and
the Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC)-continue to play major roles
in campaigns today. See L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 16, Table 1-4; 45-46, Table 2-3
(AMPAC is one of the "Top Ten" PAC fundraisers and contributors; BIPAC supplies
basic information to many multicandidate corporate PACs).
16 See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 128 ("[E]stablishing expense accounts
., providing company goods and services, [and] keeping officials on the payroll while
they are working on a campaign."); A. MATASTrR, supra note 14, at 24 (trustee accounts,
provision of stockholder lists, payroll deduction systems); L. SABATO, supra note 14, at
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All commentators on PACs agree that the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971,17 and the amendments to it in
1974,18 contributed most to the rapid ascension of PACs as
major political players in the 1970s and 1980s.19 FECA (1971)
"reformed" campaign finance regulations by linuting campaign
contributions and expenditures in federal elections, 20 but it also
established the validity of using union and corporate funds to
establish and operate separate segregated funds for political purposes (i.e., PACs). 2i Umon leaders pushed for this provision to

6-7; Adamany, PAC's and the DemocraticFinancingof Politics, 22 Asuz. L. REV 569,
583 (1980) (individual contributions were often systematically solicited from corporate

executives).
17

Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified

as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1985)).
IS Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974).
19 See,

e.g., A. MATASUR, supra note 14, at 9-11 ("The explosive growth of

corporate PACs
is largely a result of the Amendments made to FECA in 1974.");
L. SAaATo, supra note 14, at 8-9; Chiles, supra note 3, at 198-201 (1984); Epstein, The
PAC Phenomenon:An Overview, 22 Aiuz. L. REv 355, 358-59 (1980) ("The widespread
use of PAC's [sic]
is clearly a product of the crucial legal developments dunng the
period 1971-76.

").

10The Federal Election Commission (FEC)defines a contribution as "a gift,
subscription, loan
., advance, or deposit of money or anytlung of value made by any
person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 11 C.F.R.
100.7(a)(1). An expenditure, m comparison, is "[a] purchase, payment, distribution,
loan
., advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person
for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Id. at 100.8(a)(l).
Expenditures coordinated with or made at the direction of a candidate's campaign are
treated as contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 n.53 (1976). Independent expenditures are defined as: "expenditure[s] for a commumcation expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without
cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent."
11 C.F.R. 100.7(a)(1)(iii).
Some commentators suggest that Congress enacted FECA (1971) and its amendments to reform the campaign financing system by "minimizing the power of wealth
and 'special interests,' " but that the legislation had the "unanticipated and umntended"
effect of increasing the power of special interests. See, e.g., Kenski, Running With and
From the PAC, 22 Am. L. REv 627, 627-28 (1980). Other commentators are more
cynical in their assessment of Congress' motives. See Leatherberry, supra note 3, at 44
(many commentators "believe FECA (1974) was 'a deliberate attempt by Democrats to
skew the financial balance in their favor by sanctioning PACs' "); Wertheimer, The
PAC Phenomenon in American Politics,22 ARIZ. L. Ray 603, 605 (1980) (FECA (1974)
"was proposed and successfully lobbied for by labor and business groups seeking to
protect and enhance the role of PACs").
21The U.S. Supreme Court discussed this aspect of FECA (1971) in Pipefitters,
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eliminate then-existing doubts about the legitimacy of their PAC
operations? 2 Ironically, their efforts also opened the door for
corporations to establish their own PACs without fear of legal
repercussions.?
Although FECA (1971) was a step toward the coming PAC
explosion, the trigger was the amended version of FECA enacted
in 1974.24 FECA (1974) removed the last serious obstacle to the
wide-scale creation of corporate PACs by expressly permitting
government contractors to establish and admimster their own
PACs.? In addition, FECA (1974) imposed contribution limits
on individuals at $1,000 per candidate in each election 26 but
permitted PACs to contribute $5,000 per candidate in the same
period. 27 This enhanced the impact of PAC contributions com28
pared to contributions from individuals.

407 U.S. at 431-32. See also Epstein, supra note 19, at 358 (FECA (1971) "permitted
corporations and labor organizations to
establish and administer
political action
committees.").
= A. MATASuR, supra note 14, at 9-10; L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 8.
2
L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 8-9.
24 A. MATASuR, supra note 14, at 10 ("The explosive growth of corporate PACs
is largely a result of the amendments made to FECA in 1974.").
" A. MATASuR, supra note 14, at 11; L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 9.
2 U.S.C. at § 441a(a)(1)(A).
" Id. at § 441a(a)(2)(A). This section applies to "multicandidate committees." The
FEC defines a multicandidate committee as "a political committee which (i) has been
registered with the Commission, Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate for at
least 6 months; (ii) has received contributions for Federal elections from more than 50
persons; and (iii)
has made contributions to 5 or more Federal candidates." 11
C.F.R. 100.5(e)(3). The impact of this provision is that PACs which fail to meet the
requirements of multicandidate committee status can only contribute a maximum of
$1,000 to a candidate. This prevents fly-by-night PACs created to benefit just one or a
few candidates from contributing more than individuals. This in turn deters the use of
PACs to circumvent limitation on individual contributions.
1 A. MATASuR, supra note 14, at 11; L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 9. See H.
ALEXANrDER, THE CASE FOR PACs, 12 (1983) (Public Affairs Council Monograph) (PACs
filled the void left by the limits placed upon individual contributions); M. RUaiNoss,
PRINC'PLE OR PRAGMATISM: INTEREST GRoups, PACs AND CAMPAIGN CONTRMUTIONS IN
1984 2 (1985) ("The limits on individual contributions paved the way for the PACs as
a means to legally circumvent the tight provisions of the law."); L. SABATO, supra note
14, at 8-9 (limits on individual contributions "increase[d] candidates' reliance on PAC
dollars"); Conlon, The Declining Role of Individual Contributions in Financing Congressional Campaigns, 3 J. L. & POL. 467, 479 (1987) ("changes in federal election laws
have encouraged the growth of PACs to meet the increasing financial needs of
congressional candidates").
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Other political and socioeconomic factors facilitated the PAC
explosion. PACs entered the political arena during a period of
declining participation m the Democratic and Republican parties. 29 Americans were turning away from the dominant political
parties to focus their political efforts on a few issues or a single
issue? 0 PACs offer "special interest" groups3 ' an ideal vehicle
for gaining access to lawmakers by channeling money into political coffers. 32 Thus, the increasing political pluralism of the
United States during the 1970s and 1980s made PACs valuable
political tools for groups not affiliated with traditional sources

of political power, such as unions or corporations.
From 1974 to June 1987, the number of PACs registered

with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) jumped from 60813
to 4,211. 34 This is a substantial increase in the number of PACs
operating in the federal political system, but the true test of
potential political strength is how much money PACs expend to
finance political campaigns.
Since partial public financing of presidential elections
has dminished the significance of PAC money m presiden-

tial campaigns, 35 most PAC money enters congressional

29 Alexander, Introduction to ALMANAC OF FEDERAL PACs at vi-vii (1986); M.
RuBiNoF, supra note 28, at 3.
10Alexander, supra note 29 at v; M. RuaiNou, supra note 28, at 2.
1, This Note defines "special interests" broadly to include all identifiable groups
which promote specific economic, social, or other objectives for the benefit of their
members. It does not give this term any qualitative weight, positive or negative.
32 See Sorauf, PoliticalPartiesand PoliticalAction Committees: Two Life Cycles,
22 ARiz. L. REv 445, 452 (1980) ("PAC strategy is calculated to support those candidates who would best provide the access and sympathy for the group's legislative
goals."); Wertheimer, supra note 20, at 612 ("PAC campaign giving provides special
interests with access and influence, and it affects legislative decisions."); Wright, Money
and the Pollution of Politics:Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to PoliticalEquality?,
82 CoLum. L. REv. 609, 619 ("PAC money augments interest-group lobbying.").
33Wertheimer & Huwa, Campaign Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Challenges, X N.Y.U. REV L. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 48 (1980-81).
' J. Graves, S. Yuill, & L. Shier, Campaign Financing m Kentucky: A 10 1/2
Year Study of PACs 2 (1987) [hereinafter J. Graves] (paper presented by Dr. Graves, a
professor at Kentucky State University, at the 9th Annual Conference of the Council
on Governmental Ethics Laws, Quebec, Canada, September 28-30, 1987).
31 See Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 33, at 46. But see Federal Election Comm'n
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (The Court held
unconstitutional the FECA's $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures by political
committees for the support of presidential candidates receiving public financing. This
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races. 36 Annual reports from the FEC reveal that PACs spend many

millions of dollars in congressional campaigns and that the total
amount spent has steadily increased with time. 37 Critics of PACs
claim that this shows the potential threat PACs pose to democratic
politics, 38 while other commentators argue that it merely represents the public disclosure of money that entered congressional
races under the table prior to FECA. 39 In either case, the magnitude of the sums suggest that PACs do play a vital role in

financing congressional campaigns. 4o
B.

PACs in Kentucky
The extent to which PACs operated in Kentucky prior to the

mid-1970s is unclear, because research in this area began only
recently

41

Nonetheless, two differences in Kentucky's campaign

allows PACs to spend large amounts of money on their own to support presidential
candidates receiving public financing [as the NCPAC did for President Reagan in 1984].).
36 L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 9; Wertheimer & Huwa, supra note 33, at 48.
31 See 1983 FEC ANN. REP. 11, 12.
31 See A Government of, By, and For the PACS-How PACs Give You the Best
Congress Money Can Buy, in PEOPLE AGAINST PACs: A COMMON CAUSE GUmE TO
WINNING Tm WAR AGAINST POLITIcAL ACTION ComMITa s, 7-10 (1983) (Common
Cause, "a nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' lobbying organization that works to improve
the way federal and state governments operate," id. at 3, issued this special publication
on PACs).
1' L. SABATO, supra note 14, at 166; Leatherberry, supra note 3, at 44.
,0 The FEC's Final Report on the financial activity of PACs in the elections of
1983-84 reveals that PACs expended over $135 million in the elections of 1983-84. 1
FEC REPORTS ON FINANCIAL AcTIvrTY 1983-84: FnAL REPORT, PARTY AND NON-PARTY
POLITICAL CoMMmiiEs 78 (1985) (this amount represents the sum of contributions to
candidates and expenditures for and against candidates).
The most revealing data in the FEC's report for 1983-84 was that incumbent
members of the House received 42.4% of their total campaign funds from PACs while
candidates for open seats received 27% from PACs. In comparison, incumbent Senators
received 23% from PACs; challengers received 16%; and open seat contenders received
9%. 1985 FEC ANN. REP. 26, chart II.
These figures suggest that political candidates who need campaign funds on a
continuing basis, like incumbent U.S. Representatives or their counterparts at the state
level in Kentucky, can rely heavily on PAC money to finance their campaigns. This
Note considers whether this holds true in Kentucky in the next section. See infra notes
53-57 and accompanying text.
41 Several studies have been issued recently. See COMMON CAUSE/KENTUCKY, supra
note 7; J. Graves, supra note 34; Jewell & Miller, Interest Groups in Kentucky: Adapting
to the Independent Legislature (1986) (prepared for presentation at the annual meeting
of the Southern Political Science Association, Nov. 6-8, 1986); O'Keefe, Interest Group
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finance legislation and that on the federal level suggest that PAC
activity prior to the 1970s was negligible. First, unions had no

incentive to establish PACs. Kentucky law did not (and still does
not) limit political contributions and expenditures by labor orgamzations. 42 Second, Kentucky has longstanding constitutional

and statutory provisions that prohibit direct or indirect contri43
butions to political candidates by corporations.
With unions and corporations disinclined to initiate PAC

activities, the evolution of PACs in Kentucky began later than
in the national arena. More significantly, the onrush of PACs
in Kentucky did not stem from a change in regulations governing
the political activities of unions and corporations. Although

unions and corporations have their own PACs now, the law
remains unchanged. This raises the question of what provided
the impetus for the PAC movement in Kentucky during the
1970s. No definitive answers are forthcoming, but several com-

pelling common sense conclusions arise.
One obvious factor contributing to the creation of PACs

was the implementation in 1974 of limits on campaign contributions by mdividuals. 44 Once the legislature restricted the amount

of money available from individuals, PACs arose to fill the
void.

45

Another factor contributing to the rise of PACs in Kentucky
is the increasing pluralism of state politics. As noted above, the
Contributions in Kentucky's 1983 Gubernatorial and Senatorii Elections (1986) (prepared for presentation at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the Kentucky Political Science
Association, Berea, Ky., Feb. 28, 1986).
42 Kentucky's Corrupt Practices Act only applies to corporations. See KRS §§
121.025, 121.035 (Baldwin 1986). See Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Moulton, 773
F.2d 692, 697-700 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986) for a good
discussion of the legislative history of Kentucky's Corrupt Practices Act.
41 Ky. CONST.
§ 150; KRS at §§ 121.025, 121.035. See also Naegele Outdoor
Advertising, 773 F.2d at 697 ("Direct and indirect corporate contributions to candidates
have been prohibited by Kentucky since the Corrupt Practices Act of 1916." (citation
omitted)).
" KRS at § 121.150(6). This section, effective July 15, 1986, set the limit on
contributions by individuals at $4,000. From 1974 until July 1986 the limit had been
$3,000. KRS § 121.150(5) (Baldwin 1984).
41 See CommoN CAusE/KENTUCKY, supra note 7, at Table I (Total partisan expenditures increased from $3,208,280 in 1973 to $4,453,262 in 1975 while total PAC
expenditures increased from $189,919 to $588,010 in the same period.). Similarly, the
rise of PACs on the national scene followed the imposition of limits on individual
contributions in federal elections. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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national trend toward more pluralistic politics and the corresponding increase in the number of special interest groups demanding attention from public officials spurred the creation of
the PAC system. 4 This same trend has affected Kentucky politics. Historically powerful interest groups m Kentucky representing agriculture, coal, and the horse industry must now
compete with interest groups representing almost every occupation, profession, trade, business, and industry operating in the
state. 47 Many of these groups use PACs to supplement their
4
lobbying efforts with a continuing source of campaign funds.

The adoption of PACs to perform this function at the national
level was available as a model for interest groups working to

influence state and local officials in Kentucky
Together, the various forces that made PACs the ideal vehicles for the political activities of interest groups resulted in an

increasing proliferation of PACs operating in Kentucky politics.
Over the last decade, the number of PACs registered in Kentucky
has jumped from 93 to 333, an increase of 258 per cent. 49 The

See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
41 See Jewell & Miller, supra note 41, at 1, 6, 15-18, 26.
" Id. at 18-19 (As the legislature has become more independent, "some [interest]
groups have used their PACs to channel more funds into legislative races.").
41 See J. Graves, supra note 34, at 2. Graves' finding of a 254% increase was
adjusted for the increase in the number of PACs from June 1987 to Sept. 1987. PACs
registered in Kentucky as of Sept. 1987 are identified in the listing of permanent
committees registered in Kentucky compiled by the Registry of Election Finance (the
Registry).
When comparing statistical information compiled by Graves, Yuill and Shier with
that of Common Cause, significant differences in their totals are discovered. For example, findings on total PAC expenditures for 1977 reveal approximately a $600,000
discrepancy. All annual PAC expenditure totals reveal similar discrepancies.
One reason for such discrepancies between findings is that Common Cause's PAC
Study only reported PAC expenditures for partisan races, while Graves, Yuill and Shier
also reported expenditures for nonpartisan and independent elections. Another reason
for the discrepancy is that Graves, Yuill and Shier include in their figures information
on permanent committees referred to as "political PACs"-committees established to
promote candidates of one party or of a faction within a party. Common Cause contends
that these PACs should be designated as campaign committees. Telephone interview with
Alaine Goldstein, Executive Director of Common Cause in Kentucky, Oct. 27, 1987.
Given the broad definition of "permanent committee" under Kentucky law, Graves,
Yuill and Shier are correct in designating political committees as permanent committees
if they operate "on a regular basis throughout the year.
" KRS § 121.015(3)(c). This
Note accepts the findings of Graves, Yuill and Shier because they correspond with the
46
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actual number of PACs existing in a given period fluctuates as
PACs focusing on a particular election or public issue fade after

the election is over or after the issue loses significance.5 0 Although 333 PACs are currently registered m Kentucky, that
number is misleading because 145 of them are local orgamzations

for the Kentucky Educators Public Affairs Council (KEPAC). 5'
Reflecting the traditional political and socioeconomic focus of
state government, 144 of the remaimng 186 registered PACs
52
operate from Louisville, Lexington, and Frankfort.
According to a study by researchers from Kentucky State

Umversity, PACs spent $1,350,798 in Kentucky elections of 1977,
and over $2.2 million in 1986.13 These figures suggest that PACs
play significant roles in Kentucky politics, but they provide only
a rough approximation of the political influence PACs exercise.
To understand whether PAC money threatens to create a government "by the PACs, for the PACs," as Common Cause
asserts, 54 we must know the proportion of PAC expenditures to
total election expenditures. All the research done to date indicates that PACs impact more on legislative, judicial, and local
elections than on gubernatorial elections. 55 One recent study
shows that PAC expenditures compose 7.3% of total election
expenditures in the primary and general gubernatorial elections
of 1983 .56 In comparison, PAC expenditures in the Senate elec-

Registry's registration records. Furthermore, Jeanetta Sacre, who has worked with PACs
for over 12 years, helped Dr. Graves research his study with Yuill and Shier. Based on
her intimate knowledge of the day-to-day workings of PACs in Kentucky, she supports
the classification of "political committees" as permanent committees. Telephone interview with Jeanetta Sacre, April 11, 1988.
" Interview with Jeanetta Sacre, Staff Member at the Registry of Election Finance
(the Registry) who handles PAC reports and issues or questions about PACs, in Frankfort, KY (Oct. 5, 1987).
1 KEPAC is the political arm of the Kentucky Education Association. J. Graves,
supra note 34, at 2.
52 These numbers come from the Registry's listing of permanent committees registered in Kentucky as of Sept. 28, 1987 See supra note 49.
11 J. Graves, supra note 34, at 4.
s' COMMON CAUsI/KETucKY, Press Release, Sept. 9, 1987. See supra note 38 for
a description of Common Cause.
"' J. Graves, supra note 34, at 18; Jewell & Miller, supra note 41, at 6, 7.
56 Jewell & Miller, supra note 41, at table 1 (This percentage represents the average
percentage of campaign spending provided through PACs in both primary and gubernatorial elections in 1979 and 1983.).
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tions of 1983, and the House elections of 1984, compose 28.6%
and 26% of total election expenditures respectively 7
Another indicator of the political clout PACs have compared
to individuals is how much PACs can contribute to political
candidates. Under Kentucky law, individuals can give a maxi-

mum of $4,000 to any one candidate in any one election. 8 On
the other hand, Kentucky law did not limit PAC contributions
to candidates until mid-1988. Effective March 11, 1988, PACs

can only contribute a maximum of $4,000 per candidate per
election. 59 Even when PACs could give unlimited contributions
to candidates the majority consistently contributed $1,000 or less

each year.60 As a general rule, less than 20% contributed more
than $10,000 in a year. 61 Nevertheless, limiting PAC contributions should lessen the appearance that a select group of PACs

can exert greater influence on Kentucky elections than can individuals. 2
II.

REGULATING PACs

After the enactment of campaign finance reform legislation

in 1988, Kentucky law imposes far more substantive limits on
17 Id. at table 2 (This figure represents the total of those presented by Jewell &
Miller.).
"1See supra note 44.
11 The Legislature amended KRS § 121.150 to include a $4,000 limit on PAC contributions to candidates. Sentate Bill 53 [hereifiafter S.B. 53] included a provision
declaring an emergency so that it became effective when signed by the Governor on
March I1,1988. Legislative Record, April 14, 1988, at p. 9. Later, the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill 268 [hereinafter S.B. 268] making sweeping changes to Kentucky's
election laws. Included in S.B. 268 were additional amendments to KRS § 121.150. S.B.
268 took effect on July 15, 1988. Legislative Record, April 14, 1988, at p. 9. Essentially,
the combined impact of S.B. 53 and SB. 268 is that the limits on PAC contributions
are effective 4 months before the other amendments to KRS § 121.150. For convenience,
this Note will refer to S.B. 268 as amending KRS § 121.150 unless specific reference to
S.B. 53 is required.
J.Graves, supra note 34, at 4.
6, Id. These figures indicate that PAC contributions did not overwhelm political
campaigns prior to enactment of contribution limits.
6 A study by Graves, Yuill & Shier shows that 25 PACs have averaged more than
$28,000 in expenditures annually. See id. at 9, 11 (note that nine of these PACs had
only existed one year at time of study). Furthermore, this study shows that 40 to 50
PACs channelled $10,000 or more each year into political coffers. This suggests that a
select group of PACs could exert substantial influence on Kentucky elections. See id. at
2-4.
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PACs than it had previously Prior to 1988, the focus of the
regulations was on procedural requirements designed to ensure
complete disclosure of receipts, expenditures, contributors, and
recipients of contributions. Kentucky law now imposes limits on
PAC contributions to candidates just as it limits individual contributions to candidates. This section examines the regulations
applicable to PACs, with particular emphasis on the 1988 finance
reform legislation. This section also examines the arguments for
and against limiting PAC involvement in financing state political
campaigns.
A.

Existing Regulations

The current regulatory scheme may be divided for analytical
purposes into five parts: (1) filing requirements; (2) operational
requirements; (3) reporting requirements; (4) limitations on contributions and expenditures; and (5) admimstration and enforcement provisions.
1. Filing Requirements
To register for operation in Kentucky, a PAC must file a
statement of organization with the Registry of Election Finance
(the Registry), giving official notice of intention and time of
organization. 63 This statement lists the names, addresses, and
positions of the PAC's officers and designates the candidate(s)
or issue(s) that the PAC plans to support or oppose. 64 The law
requires that the PAC have at least two officers, a chairperson
and treasurer One person cannot serve in both capacities. 65
Obviously, creating a PAC is not a complex task.
Effective July 15, 1988, Kentucky law requires PACs to
choose a name that "shall reasonably identify to the public the
sponsorship and purpose of the committee. 6 The Registry must
refuse registration until the PAC files in a manner that "clearly
identiffies] the specific purpose, sponsorship and source from

KRS § 121.170(l) (Baldwin 1986).
6, Id. The Registry furnishes a form called the "Political Committee Statement of
Organization" to those who wish to organize a PAC. Sacre interview, supra note 50.
63 KRS at § 121.170(3).
6 Id. at § 121.170(1) (as amended by S.B. 268).
0
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which the committee originates." 6 7 Proponents of this requirement argued successfully that it will help remove the mystery
surrounding PACs whose names give no hint what candidate,
issue, or ideology they support or oppose. 68
2.

OperationalRequirements

All contributions made to a PAC to support or to defeat a
candidate in an election must be made through the PAC's treasurer 69 PACs must establish a primary campaign depository with
a financial institution authorized to transact business in Kentucky before they accept any contributions.70 A statement listing
the names, addresses, and occupations of contributors of more
than $300 and of all cash contributors must accompany deposIts. 71 Effective 1988, "deputy campaign treasurers may make
expenditures from secondary depositories but only from momes
which first have been deposited in the primary campaign depos-

itory

"72

3.

Reporting Requirements

PACs must file reports with the Registry on a quarterly basis
from the time of inception to the time of termination.7 3 These
quarterly reports, made on forms issued by the Registry, must
disclose "all money, loans or other things of value received by
[the PAC] from any source, since the date of the last report." 7 4
Additionally, the PAC must list the names, addresses, occupations, and ages (if under legal voting age) of persons or groups
who give the PAC more than $300.75 The report must identify
the amount that each contributor gave and the date of contribution. Finally, all expenditures which the PAC makes or incurs,
including but not limited to contributions to candidates, must

67

Id.

"See

CommoN CAUSE/KENTUCKY supra note 7.

Id. at § 121.150(1).
70 Id. at § 121.220(1).
7, Id. at § 121.220(2).
6

72 Id. at § 121.220(l) (as amended by S.B. 268).
71
4

Id. at § 121.180(5) (Baldwin 1986).

Id.

73 Id.
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be set forth in the quarterly reports. 76 These reports are available
for public inspection upon receipt at the Registry7
The Legislature made only slight changes in 1988 to the
reporting requirements imposed on PACs. The changes require
that PACs explicitly identify cash contributors and the "aggre78
gate amount of cash contributions" received.
4.

Limitations on Contributionsand Expenditures

As of March 11, 1988, Kentucky limits the amount PACs
can contribute to a candidate or expend in an election to $4,000
per candidate, per election. 79 Also, as of March 1988, PACs
cannot accept a contribution in excess of $4,000 from "any
person in any one (1) election." 8 0
PACs are limited in the type of contribution that they may
accept based on the contribution's form and its source. First,
PACs may not accept "any anonymous contribution in excess
of one hundred dollars ($100), and all such contributions in
excess of one hundred dollars ($100) shall be returned to the
donor, if the donor can be determined." 8 1 Second, they may not
76 Id. Note: this includes "independent expenditures." An "independent expenditure" is statutorily defined as an expenditure: "[m]ade for a communication which
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate and which is
not made with any direct or indirect cooperation, consent, request or suggestion or
consultation involving a candidate or his authorized committee or agent." KRS at §
121.150(1).
Id. at § 121.180(7).
71 Id. at § 121.180(5) (as amended by S.B. 268).
71 Id. at § 121.150(6) (as amended by S.B. 268). At the same time the Legislature
enacted contribution limits it also enacted provisions prohibiting the creation of subsidiary PACs and the shifting of money for the purpose of circumventing those limits.
KRS § 121.150 (as amended by S.B. 268) provides:
(7) Except for permanent committees organized as of January 1, 1988,
permanent committees or contributing organizations affiliated by bylaw
structure or by registration, as determined by the registry of election
finance, shall be considered as one (1) committee for purposes of applying
the contribution limits of subsection (6) of this section.
(8) No permanent committee shall contribute funds to another permanent committee for the purpose of circumventing contribution limits of
subsection (6) of this section.
10 Id. at § 121.150(6) (as amended by S.B. 268). Individuals may not contribute
"more than four thousand dollars ($4,000) to all permanent committees and contributing
organizations in any one (1) year." Id. at § 121.150(9) (as amended by S.B. 268).
", Id. at § 121.150(3) (as amended by S.B. 268). If the PAC cannot find a donor,
the contribution escheats to the state. Id.
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accept cash contributions over $100.82 Finally, beginning in 1988,
PACs may not "accept any contribution in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) from any person who shall not become
eighteen (18) years of age on or before the day of the next
general election.''83
5.

Administration and Enforcement

The Registry of Election Finance admimsters and initiates
enforcement of campaign finance regulations in Kentucky It is
an independent agency composed of seven members.8 4 The Governor appoints four members, and the Lieutenant Governor,
Attorney General, and Secretary of State each appoint one member. 5 The Registry must appoint a full-time executive director,
legal counsel, accountant, and such other employees necessary
86
to perform its function.
Initially, the Registry was meant to be a repository for
campaign reports.17 It now takes an active role in administering
campaign finance regulations by informing candidates, PACs,
and other political participants of their legal responsibilities and
by initiating enforcement actions against those who violate the
law 88 In particular, the Registry requires timely and accurate
89
reports.
As a general rule, the Registry prefers informal enforcement
of the regulations by notifying violators that they have erred
and requesting correction.9 It may, however, conduct full-scale
adversary hearings when it "concludes that there is probable
cause to believe that the law has been violated. " 91 These hearings
are subject to judicial review 92 Enforcement ranges from cease
Id. at § 121.150(4) (Baldwin 1986).
Id. at § 121.150(5) (as amended by S.B. 268).
Id. at § 121.110(1) (as amended by S.B. 268).
11Id. at § 121.110(2)(a)-(f) (as amended by S.B. 268).
"Id. at § 121.120(1) (Baldwin 1986).
" Interview with Raymond Wallace, Executive Director of the Registry, in Frankfort, KY (Oct. 5, 1987); Jewell & Miller, supra note 41 at 5.
" Wallace interview, supra note 87.
99Id.
90 Id.
", KRS at § 121.140(2).
Id. at § 121.140(4).
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and desist orders to $100-per-day fines for each day the violation
remains uncorrected. 93 Imposition of maximum fines are rare,
and collection of fines from those who ignore the board's order
requires that the board turn the case over to the Attorney
94
General for prosecution.
Beginning in 1988, the Attorney General will have primary

responsibility for enforcing election laws, including those concerning campaign finance regulation.9 Consequently, when "the
registry concludes that there is probable cause to believe that the

campaign finance law has been violated willfully, it shall refer
such violation to the attorney general for prosecution." 96 The
Registry may only pursue prosecution for itself if "the attorney
general or appropriate local prosecutor falls to prosecute in a

timely fashion.''

97

The Registry must petition the circuit court

and show good cause why its attorney should be appointed to
prosecute the violation. Upon showing good cause, the circuit

court must grant the Registry's petition. 98
B.

Recent Rumblings
Although threatened to be overcome by the crush, proposals

to reform campaign finance laws received serious consideration
from legislators in 1988. 99 Reports that candidates spent more
than $19 million in statewide primary races in 19 87t0 prompted

vigorous criticism of money's domnance of political races and
of the laws which permit its domnance. 01

1, Id. at

§ 121.140(2)(a), (2)(c).
Wallace interview, supra note 87; KRS at § 121.140(3).
91 Senate Bill 268 created two new sections to KRS Chapter 15 outlimng the
Attorney General's responsibilities.
96 KRS at § 121.140(3) (as amended by S.B. 268) (emphasis added).
97 Id. at § 121.140(3) (as amended by S.B. 268). The Registry may also pursue
prosecution if the Attorney General so requests. Id.
9, Id. at § 121.140(4) (as amended by S.B. 268).
99 Senate Bill 53 passed the Senate 36-0: the House passed it 98-0. Legislative
Record, April 14, 1988, at p. 9.
100See Johnson, Tally Shows Primary Was Costliest Election, The Couner-Journal
(Louisville), July 6, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
101See, e.g., Huge Campaign Bills Stir Calls for Reform, Ledger-Independent
(Maysville, Ky.), July 7, 1987, at 7, col. 3; A Gold-Plated Primary, The State Journal
(Frankfort, Ky.), July 8, 1987, at 4A, col. 1.
94
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Critics of Kentucky's campaign finance laws received compelling evidence of the need for reform when R.G. Dunlop, a

staff writer for the Louisville Courier-Journal, published a series
of eight articles exposing widespread corruption in Kentucky's
politics and government. 10 2 Perhaps reflecting the seriousness of
the revelations, both gubernatorial candidates pledged support

for broad-based reforms of campaign finance laws prior to the
general election. 10 3

Among proposed reforms currently circulating in the press
are some designed to reduce the influence, real or perceived,
that PACs exert on Kentucky's political system. 1 4 One persistent

and compelling criticism of PACs is that they seek to establish
access to public officials with campaign contributions. 10 5 Some
political observers charge that PACs use their access to public
officials to exercise undue influence over political processes.106

112 Dunlop,

supra note 1.
,03Wilkinson and Harper indicated their support for campaign finance reforms
during their second debate. Wilkinson and Harper Debate, sponsored by the League of
Women Voters (Oct. 19, 1987), in Richmond, Ky. (Videotape available at Division of
T.V & Radio, Video Library, Eastern Kentucky Umversity Video Library, Perkins
Building #102, Richmond, Ky. 40475-0951).
104See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
,"I One incident which occurred after the primary elections gives credence to warnings by groups like Common Cause that PACs expect something in return for their
contributions. Thomas H. Meeker, president of Churchill Downs and chairperson of
Churchill Downs PAC, urged in a letter to several members of the racing industry to
help Wallace Wilkinson retire the $2.3 million loan that Wilkinson made to his campaign.
In the letter, Meeker clearly stated that his objective was to "make sure that we have
his [Wilkinson's] ear." Approximately $5,000 of his ear-catching tune came from Churchill Downs PAC. Johnson, Downs President, Wary of Lottery Seeks Racing's Support
for Wilkinson, The Couner-Journal (Louisville), July 15, 1987, at Bi, col. 1. Although
Meeker supported another Democratic candidate m the primary, his concern about the
potentially adverse consequences that a state lottery would have on the racing industry
drove him to establish a channel of commumcation with the undisputed front-runner in
the Governor's race. Id. at BI, col. 2 & B3, col. 3. No matter that Meeker intended to
conduct his activities within legal limits, his use of -political contributions to obtain
access to the next governor creates a strong appearance of impropriety. That he chose
a PAC to channel contributions to Wilkinson's campaign clearly establishes the legitimacy of claims that PAC contributions may be used to influence public policymakers,
or that they at least create this perception.
For an editorial reaction to this report see Van Curon, Backed Wrong Horse in
Primary, He Now Wants Wilkinson's Ear, Bath County News Outlook (Owingsville,
Ky.), July 23, 1987, at 11, col. 1.
106 See Van Curon, supra note 105; see also J. Abourezk, Ex-Senator Calls PACs
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Of course, the same charge is applicable to individuals who
make large contributions to candidates. Yet PACs held a decisive
advantage over individuals in the bid for access due to the
discrepancy between limits on contributions by PACs and those

by individuals. Although individuals can only contribute a maximum of $4,000 to a candidate, PACs could contribute unlimited
amounts. Thus, a candidate could fund his or her entire campaign with PAC contributions.0 7 By displacing the importance
of campaign contributions from individuals, PACs have the
potential to gain not only access, but substantial political influence. As previously noted, this process is not apparent in gubernatonal campaigns, but it appears well advanced in legislative
campaigns. 101 The recent enactment of limits on PAC contributions, like those limiting individuals, ensures that PACs cannot
dominate access to public officials merely by exploiting the legal

limits on individual contributions.
A compelling hypothesis for why PACs concentrate their
efforts on legislative campaigns is that they are responding to

the increased independence exercised by the legislative branch in
Kentucky's political system. 1°9 No longer content to allow the

'One of the Most Corrupt' Financing Schemes Ever, The Courier-Journal (Louisville),
Feb. 23, 1986, at D3, col. I (Abourezk was formerly senator from South Dakota).
For interesting evidence of PACs' desire to influence lawmakers see PACs Switched
Sides, Study Says, The Couner-Journal (Louisville), Mar. 20, 1987, at A6, col. 2
(Common Cause found numerous instances in which PACs switched sides after initial
candidates lost).
,07See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
109 Jewell & Miller, supra note 41, at 3-5, 11.
An interesting development concerning PACs and the legislature has arisen and
may provide the impetus necessary for the passage of some type of reform legislation.
In Governor Wilkinson's first press conference, he indicated that he might use a PAC
formed by his campaign chairperson, Danny Briscoe, to support Democrats running
against Democratic incumbents in the legislature who opposed is programs. Rugeley,
Wilkinson Vows to Use Influence, Lexington Herald-Leader, Nov. 6, 1987, at Al, col.
5. Quite naturally, Wilkinson's remarks drew a hostile response from legislative leaders
who considered it a "veiled threat" to the independent legislature. Rugeley & Brammer,
Wilkinson 'Threat' Spurs Bill to Limit Campaign Contributions by PACs, Lexington
Herald-Leader, Dec. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 2. As a result, Senate President Pro Tem John
"Eck" Rose proposed legislation to limit PAC contributions to candidates to $4,000 per
election. Id. at Al, col. 4 and A7, col. 1. One hopes that the legislature will realize, as
did the media, that contribution limits alone will not reduce the influence the Governor's
PAC could wield. He Got Their Attention, All Right, Lexington Herald-Leader, Dec.
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governor to control all phases of government, the legislature
now occupies a more independent and equal position vis-a-vis
the executive branch.1 10 As a consequence, interest groups are
likely to reinforce their lobbying efforts with PAC contributions
to legislators. Since the governor no longer controls the legislative process and since he or she cannot run for reelection,"'
spreading contributions among a block of legislators is a more

effective long-term political investment than placing all the money
on a candidate for governor. 12 The underlying implication of
this hypothesis, that PACs contribute proportionately more

money to legislative campaigns than to gubernatorial campaigns
as a response to the legislature's enhanced position in the deci-

sion-making process, lends further legitimacy to the arguments
that PACs expect a return on their political investments.'
The final reason critics of PACs support stricter limits on
their activities is the concern that individuals will use PACs to
circumvent the $4,000 limit on individual contributions." 4 Once
again, the 1987 pnmary elections offer examples of how this
might happen." 5 As of March 1988, an individual may contribute

3, 1987, at AI4, col. 1. Without comprehensive reform measures which also address the
problems posed by "independent expenditures," a contribution limit will have little or
no effect on PAC activities. Id.
Realizing the disturbance created in the legislature, Wilkinson retracted his remark
about using the PAC against recalcitrant legislators. Rugeley, Wilkinson Says He Won't
Use PAC to Fight Opponents in Legislature, Lexington Herald-Leader, Dec. 4, 1987, at
Al, col. 5. Wilkinson stated that the PAC would be used to promote particular issues
like the proposed lottery. Id. at A16, col. 1. Wilkinson's sudden reversal did not ease
Rose's concerns "because the PAC's registration form said it would be used to support
candidates." Id. at A16, col. 2. Rose suggested that Wilkinson amend the form. Id.
11oSee Rugeley & Brammer, supra note 109.
Ky. CONST. § 71.
m See Jewell & Miller, supra note 41, at 3-5 and 11 (legislature has grown in power
since 1979).
"I See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
"4

See supra notes 6, 7.

"I In one case, four members of Citizens Committed to Better Government, all of
whom were employees or officers of a car dealership, gave the PAC $21,000 on May
21. One individual gave $8,000 and another gave $6,000. The same day the PAC received
the money it sent the money to the Wilkinson campaign. Johnson, PAC That Aided
Wilkinson Asked to Refund Donations,The Couner-Journal (Louisville), Sept. 17, 1987,
at Al, col. 4.
After discovenng the apparent subterfuge, the Registry set a precedent by requesting
that the Wilkinson campaign return the money to the original contributors. Rugeley,
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no more than $4,000 to any one PAC in any one election.

76
16

This will lessen the impact of attempts to circumvent individual

limits with PAC contributions.
So far, few commentators have stepped forward to defend
the PAC system as it now functions in the Commonwealth.
Surprisingly, when the legislature addressed a reform package in
the 1988 legislative session, no organizers, members, or other
supporters of PACs publicly opposed comprehensive changes in
the status quo. Should they do so in the future, they can draw
upon various arguments in support of PACs formulated by

commentators on federal elections. Of particular interest to Kentuckians is that Senator Ford publicly supports PACs and their
11 7
role in the democratic process.

Iromcally, one argument for PACs also underlies the fears
expressed by their critics: PACs provide candidates with the

funds necessary to run a viable political campaign."' The need
for substantial amounts of money is especially critical at a time
when campaign costs are rising each year.11 9 Restricting funds

available to candidates in a campaign financing system that relies
totally upon voluntary contributions from the private sector
forces candidates to spend more time pursuing campaign funds

than discussing the issues. This in turn benefits wealthy candidates who can spend their personal fortunes (or loan their campaigns large sums of money without fear of bankruptcy should
they lose) 20 to fund a media blitz characteristic of many victo-

Questions concerning the constitutionality of this provision are beyond the scope of this
Note.
Wilkinson PAC Told to Return $6,000 in Gifts, Lexington Herald-Leader, Sept. 17,
1987, at BI, col. 6. The Registry had no authority to enforce its request, but Wilkinson's
campaign did return the amount in excess of that which the individuals involved could
give under the law. Johnson, supra, at AS, col. 1.
H6 KRS § 121.150(6) (as amended by S.B. 268).
117Ford, View from the Senate, in Tna PAC HANDBOOK 13-17 (1980).
"I H. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 30.
19 See Goldstein, Political Finance in Kentucky, in KENTUCKY GOVERNMENT AND
PoLircs 170, 178-84 (J. Goldstein ed. 1984); Jones, Financing State Elections, in MoNa
AND Pouncs iN TnE UNrrm) STATEs 173-80 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
"2 In 1988, the Legislature imposed limits on the amount of money candidates may
loan to their campaign committees. Candidates running for Governor may not loan their
campaigns more than $50,000 m any one election; candidates for other statewide offices
may not loan themselves more than $25,000; and candidates in all other races may not
loan themselves more than $10,000. KRS § 121.150(13) (as amended by S.B. 268).

1987-88]

PACs iN

KENTUCKY

rious campaigns in the last decade. 12 1
Another argument in support of PACs is that they increase
opportunities for individuals to participate in the political process.2 If some tangible evidence exists to support this claim, it
is a difficult factor to ignore. Given the historically low turnouts
by Kentucky's electorate, promoting more public participation
in politics is a worthy objective.12 But to agree that the objective
is laudatory does not foreclose investigating whether PACs have
increased the number of Kentuckians actively participating in
politics. At least one study indicates that PAC contributors are
less committed to political involvement and vote less than individuals who make direct contributions to candidates.' 24 Even
assuming PACs do increase public interest in politics, the legislature seems to have fashioned regulations that will not dilute
25
this positive aspect of the PAC system.1

21

See Johnson, Free-Spending Campaign Has TV Stations Smiling, The Courier-

Journal (Louisville), Apr. 24, 1987, at Al, col. 5 ("Wilkinson and Beshear will spend
more than $1 million on TV, Brown more than $1.5 million according to their campaigns.").
'2 Adamany, PoliticalAction Committees and DemocraticPolitics, 1983 DET. C.L.
REv 1013, 1013-14, 1018-20; H. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 29; Budde, The Practical
Role of CorporatePACs in the PoliticalProcess, 22 ARIZ. L. REV 555, 555-58 (1980);
Ford, supra note 117, at 13-14; Comment, Campaign FinanceRe-Reform: The Regulation of Independent Political Committees, 71 CAns. L. REv 673, 674 (1983).
'3

See Blanchard, PoliticalPartiesand Elections, in

KENTUCKY GOVERNMENT AND

PoLrrcs 141, 163 (J. Goldstein ed. 1984).
"A, See Jones & Miller, Financing Campaigns: Macro Level Innovation and Micro
Level Response, 38 W POL. Q. 187 (1985). This study suggests that among four groups
of organizational contributors (to PACs, parties, candidates, or some combination):
PAC contributors
were least likely to have engaged in traditional
campaign activities. Compared to candidate contributors, only a third to
half as many PAC contributors reported wearing a campaign button,
working for the party, or attending a rally or fund raiser. Also, a smaller
percentage of PAC contributors than those using any other mode of
contributing reported voting, especially in the general election.
Id. at 204.
115Limiting PAC contributions to candidates, for example, does not inhibit participation in political activities by PAC contributors. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21
(1976), the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate
or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his [or her]
political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
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Although commentators have presented other arguments supporting PAC activities, 126 the one which most restricts the scope
of proposed regulatory schemes is that PACs are protected by
the first amendment's guarantees of free speech and free association. The United States Supreme Court held in Buckley v
Valeo' 27 that the campaign finance regulations embodied in FECA
(1974) implicate fundamental freedoms of speech and association.12 Therefore, recent reforms to Kentucky's regulatory scheme

must remain within the constitutional parameters set by Buckley
and its progeny 129 This Note considers that line of cases, federal
and state, in the next section.
III.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON REGULATING

PACs

Buckley v Valeo

In Buckley v Valeo, 1 ° the United States Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of "[t]he intricate statutory
scheme adopted by Congress to regulate federal election
campaigns ' ' 131 embodied in the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, as amended in 1974.132 This landmark decision has
evoked much scholarly commentary on its implications for federal and state efforts to regulate campaign financing. 13 For the

'6 See generally H. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 29-30 (claims PACs serve as
"safeguard against undue influence by the government or by the media"); Budde, supra
note 122, at 557 ("PACe assist candidates in effectively managing their campaigns and
budgets.").
'" 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 14-15.
,19See infra notes 130-248 and accompanying text. For instance, Buckley prevents
the imposition of limits on how much a candidate may spend of his or her own money
in political campaigns. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54.
130

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

3

Id. at 12.

0Iz See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment
and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAMn'. L. REa. 1045 (1985) (agrees with Supreme
Court's first amendment analysis); Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath,
and Its Prospects: The Constitutionalityof Government Restraintson PoliticalCampaign
Financing, 29 V~AD. L. REv 1327 (1976) (written by co-counsel for plaintiffs in
Buckley); Wright, supra note 32 (Judge Wright wrote the Court of Appeals' decision
reversed in Buckley).

1987-881

PACs IN KENTUCKY

1033

purposes of this Note, three provisions of FECA (1974) challenged in Buckley are particularly significant in determining what
regulations of PAC activities are constitutionally permissible: (1)
limitations on contributions; (2) limitations on expenditures; and
(3) reporting requirements.
The crux of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley was its
conclusion that campaign contributions and expenditures are
forms of political speech and political association.1 4 As such,
limits upon them "operate in an area of the most fundamental
First Amendment activities." ' 135 Although freedom of speech and
freedom of association are not absolute, restraints on them are
"subject to the closest scrutiny "136 Significant restraints on them
are constitutional only if "the State demonstrates a sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
1 37
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms."
Supporters of FECA (1974) maintained that its regulatory
scheme served three governmental interests. They argued that
"the primary interest served
by the Act
is the prevention
of corruption
spawned by the real or imagined coercive
influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office."' 38 Additionally,
they argued that the State has legitimate "ancillary" interests in
leveling the relative ability of rich and poor to influence political
campaigns and in slowing the rapid increase of campaign costs
"to open the political system more widely to candidates without
access to sources of large amounts of money ",139 After considering these arguments the Supreme Court concluded that the
only governmental interest "sufficiently important" to justify
the provisions of FECA (1974) was the interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption. 140 The Court then

"4

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.

"4 Id. at 14.

I5 at 25.
Id.
Id. (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
13, Id.
"7

"9 Id. at 26.
110See BeVier, supra note 133, at 1081 n.169; Comment, supra note 122, at 682;
cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29 (The Supreme Court did not expressly state tis, but the
holding m Buckley and the cases following it have recogmzed the prevention of corruption as the only legitimate state interest for regulating political expenditures.).
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considered whether the challenged provisions of FECA (1974)
were narrowly drawn to fulfill the State's legitimate objective.
1. Contribution Limits
FECA (1974) limited contributions from individuals to $1,000
per candidate, per election, and from PACs to $5,000 per candidate, per election. 14' The Court's holding that contribution
limits are constitutional rests upon a bifurcated analysis of first
amendment guarantees. First, the Court found that although
contributions to candidates are "symbolic expression[s] of support" which "may result in politicalexpression [speech] if spent
by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters,
the transformation of contributions into political debate involves
speech by someone other than the contributor."' 142 Since "[tihe
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size of his [or her] contribution,' ' 4 limits
on contributions are "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free commumcation." 44 Thus, the
Court concluded that contribution limits "do not undermine to
any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens,
associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political
145
parties."
The second prong of the Court's analysis considered whether
contribution limits unconstitutionally infringe upon the contnbutor's freedom of association. The Court held that "[m]aking
a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate
a person with a candidate."' 46 Nonetheless, the Court held that
the contribution limits were focused narrowly upon the interest
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. 147
Three factors contributed to the Court's holding: (1) individuals

" 2 U.S.C. § 441 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of May IS,1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 486 (redesignated 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
141
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
143Id.

I" Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 29.

141

,46
Id.

at 22.

147
Id. at 25-28.
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were still free to volunteer their services to political campaigns;
(2) individuals were still free to express their political beliefs
independently; and (3) individuals were still free to create or
join voluntary associations, such as PACs, to support political
campaigns. 148 Since the contribution limits were drawn narrowly
to satisfy the State's legitimate interest in preventing corruption
or the appearance of corruption, the Court upheld the constitutionality of those provisions.
In addition to this constitutional analysis of contribution
limits, the Court addressed a separate challenge to the regulations on PAC contributions. FECA (1974) allowed PACs to give
$5,000 to a candidate only if it had been registered with the
FEC for at least six months, "received contributions from more
than 50 persons, and
contributed to five or more candidates
for federal office."' 149 Opponents of FECA (1974) argued "that
these qualifications unconstitutionally discriminate against ad
hoc orgamzations in favor of established interest groups and
impermissibly burden free association." ' 15 ° The Court rejected
this claim, stating that the provision "enhances the opportunity
of bona fide groups to participate in the election process," and
"serve[s] the permissible purpose of preventing individuals from
evading the applicable contribution limitations by labeling themselves committees."' 51 Thus, Kentucky's limits on PAC contributions and qualifications on a PAC's right to contribute serve
the legitimate purpose of preventing individuals from using PACs
to evade limits on individual contributions, and are therefore
clearly constitutional.
2.

Expenditure Limits

In contrast to contribution limits, the Court held that "expenditure limitations impose far greater restraints on the freedom

1" Id. at 28. The Court noted that existing law "permits corporations and labor
unions to establish segregated funds to solicit voluntary contributions to be utilized for
political purposes." Id. at 28 n.31.
,,9
Id. at 35. This provision is currently codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A). See
supra note 27.
,50
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 35-36.
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of speech and association.' 5 2 To avoid finding the provision
limiting expenditures unconstitutionally vague, the Court narrowed its scope to cover only "expenditures for communications
that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office."' 53 Even so, the Court
held the limits unconstitutional, because they are not an effective
54
means to reduce corruption or the appearance of corruption.'
In a strange twist, the Court concluded that since the provision
only limited "expenditures that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate," a reading
of the statute imposed by the Court, individuals and groups
could easily circumvent the limitation by eschewing express terms
of advocacy 155 Furthermore, the Court indicated its doubt that
independent expenditures pose the same "dangers of real or
apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large
campaign contributions."'' 56 The Court concluded that limits on
independent expenditures do not serve the government's interest,
but place substantial restraints upon the exercise of free speech
157
and association.
3.

Reporting Requirements

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the reporting requirements imposed by FECA (1974). The Court held
that the disclosure provisions serve the State's substantial interests in informing the electorate and preventing corruption. 158
Requiring disclosure of contributions and independent expenditures is clearly constitutional after Buckley 159 Consequently,
Kentucky's campaign finance laws rely heavily upon the enforcement of public disclosure of contributions and expenditures to

Id. at 44.
-' Id. at 44. This language narrows the scope of the provision to independent
expenditures. For the current definition of independent expenditures see supra note 20.
- Id. at 45.
115 Id. (emphasis added).
06 Id. at 46.
1'3Id. at 47-48 ("While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any
112

substantial governmental interest
sion.").
158 Id. at 66-67.

See id. at 84.

., it heavily burdens core First Amendment expres-
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combat corruption of the political process and the appearance
of such a problem.i 60
B.

Post-Buckley

Since Buckley, the Court has issued several decisions dealing
specifically with regulations affecting PACs. While subsequent
decisions have given more definition to the constitutional parameters established in Buckley, they have retained the same fundamental principles and theoretical constructs. The most
significant principle established in Buckley is that the only compelling state interest in regulating campaign finances is to prevent
corruption or the appearance of corruption.1 61 Once limited in
this fashion, the State's constitutional authority to regulate campaign financing can only extend as far as the Court's definition
of corruption allows. For example, an element of the Court's
defimtion is that a candidate for public office benefits from the
contribution or expenditure regulated by the State. The Court's
recurrent references to the dangers of quid pro quo relationships
encapsulates its defimtional focus on a situation in which a
contributor expects something from a candidate in return for
campaign funds.162 Thus, the Court concluded in First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v Bellotti 63 that: "[r]eferenda are held on
issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption
perceived in cases involving candidate elections
simply is
not present in a popular vote on a public issue." 1 6
In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts criminal
statute that prohibited banks and business corporations from
making contributions or expenditures to influence the outcome
of referendum proposals. 16 Despite the Court's conclusion that

160 Wallace

interview, supra note 87.

161See supra notes 146-48.
'- 424 U.S. at 26-27, 45, 47 ("To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity
of our system of representative democracy is undermined." Id. at 26-27).
16 435 U.S. 765 (1978), reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
364 Id.
at 790 (citations omitted).
316 Id.
at 776. For discussions of Bellotti and its implications see Bolton, ConstitutionalLimitations on Restricting Corporateand Union PoliticalSpeech, 22 ARiz. L.
Rav 373 (1980); Fox, CorporatePoliticalSpeech: The Effect of First NationalBank of
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corporate involvement in issue elections does not pose a threat
of corruption to the political process, it stated that: "[i]f appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings
that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine
democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving
First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration."i6 How much evidence or the type of evidence
sufficient to merit the Court's consideration remains an open

question. 167
In Citizens Against Rent Control v Berkeley68 the Court
invalidated a city ordinance which limited to $250 contributions
to committees formed to participate in issue elections. The Court
did not address the question left open in Bellotti (regarding the
validity of limits as opposed to prohibitions on such activities)
because the ordinance applied to contributions by persons, not
just corporations. 169 Reduced to its simplest terms, the basis for
the Court's holding in Citizens Against Rent Control was its
conclusion that: "Buckley identified a single narrow exception
to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the
First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of
undue influence of large contributors to a candidate.''1 70 In
passing, the Court noted that "the record in this case does not
support the California Supreme Court's conclusion that section
602 is needed to preserve voters' confidence in the ballot measure
process. 17 1 Therefore, whether a state can justify limitations on

Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on CorporateReferendum Spending, 67
KY. L.J. 75 (1978-79) (Fox represented the appellant corporations in Bellotti); Kiley,
PACing the Burger Court: The CorporateRight to Speak and the Public Right to Hear
After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARIZ. L. REv 427 (1980) (Kiley represented
Massachusetts in Bellott).
'6

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.

Fox maintains that it is "extremely unlikely that a particular record or legislative
recitation of spending history would be sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition
of any limitation on corporate spending." Fox, supra note 165, at 94.
- 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
167

169

Id. at 299 n.6.

Id. at 296-97 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 299. Justice Marshall's concurrence and Justice Blackmun's concurrence
indicate that the record provides inadequate evidence of a threat of corruption. Id. at
303-03. Justice White's dissent, on the other hand, cites several situations involving
corporate involvement in issue elections which suggest corruption. Id. at 307-09 nn.3-5.
170
171
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PAC contributions and expenditures in issue elections depends
on development of an adequate judicial record or legislative
findings of fact showing that PACs pose a threat to corrupt or
to destroy public confidence in the ballot measure process. Until
the Court reveals what findings are adequate to alter its analysis,
regulations of PAC contributions or expenditures in issue elections are of dubious constitutionality 172
One noteworthy aspect of Citizens Against Rent Control is
the Court's decision to invalidate limits on contributions. This
is significant because the Court's definition of corruption focuses
on contributions to a candidate. In Buckley, The Court stated
that: "[t]o the extent that large contributionsare given to secure
a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined.' '1 73 A literal reading of this passage is consistent
with the Court's decision in Citizens Against Rent Control in
that no threat of corruption exists unless a candidate is receiving
a contribution. Yet, the Court has not extended this reasoning
to the logical conclusion that contributions to PACs pose no
threat of corruption because they do not go to candidates.
That the Court has allowed limits on contributions in situations not involving candidates indicates that the State has a
legitimate interest in something other than just preventing the
creation of quid pro quo arrangements. A majority of the Court
identified this interest in CaliforniaMedical Ass'n v Fed. Election Comm'n 7 4 Although CaliforniaMedical Ass'n issued in a
plurality opinion, the plurality and Justice Blackmun, in his

172Kentucky law does not limit contributions or expenditures by political issues
committees. KRS §§ 121.015(3)(b), 121.150(6) (as amended by S.B. 268). These committees are prohibited, however, from accepting anonymous contributions, cash contnbutions, and contributions from persons under 18 that exceed $100. KRS § 121.150(3)(6) (as amended by S.B. 268). Given the limited intrusiveness of the limits on the form
of the contribution and the obvious desire to prevent corrupt practices, the first two
restrictions seem constitutional. The constitutionality of limiting contributions by persons
under 18 is less clear, however. Although government has traditionally limited the right
to vote on the basis of age, these limits are expressly stated in the state and federal
constitupons. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 145. The author
suggests that limits on a person's political contributions based upon that person's age
must also be authorized by an express constitutional provision.
7 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
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concurrence, held that the State has an interest in limiting contributions to PACs to ensure that PAC contributors do not
circumvent limitations on their personal contributions to candidates. 175 Drawing an analogy with the $25,000 limit on aggregate
annual contributions upheld in Buckley, the Court concluded
that the State has a legitimate interest in preserving "the integrity
of the contribution restrictions ' 17 6 imposed to prevent the creation of quid pro quo relationships. Thus, at least in the context
of contribution limts, the Court recognizes two levels of corruption in which the State has a legitimate interest: (1) quid pro
quo relationships; and (2) evasion of individual contribution
limits. Given the legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of
contribution limits, Kentucky's $4,000 limit on contributions to
PACs177 and the $4,000 aggregate limit on individual contributions to all PACs in a year 178 is clearly constitutional.
The Court also considered the regulation of contributions to
PACs in Fed. Election Comm'n v Nat'l Right to Work Comm. 179
This time, however, the challenged regulation limited the manner
in which certain PACs can solicit contributions and the class of
contributors from whom they can solicit contributions. 80 The
provision targeted PACs affiliated with corporations and umons,
restricting the class of their contributors to "members." National Right to Work Committee (National Right to Work), a
nonprofit corporation without capital stock, was formed to lobby
against "compulsory unionism."

171

81

Despite the federal regulation

Id. at 198-99 (plurality opinion); id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
at 199. See also id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

176Id.

1" KRS § 121.150(6) (as amended by S.B. 268).
173 KRS § 121.150(9) (as amended by S.B. 268).
.79 459 U.S.
197 (1982).
Io Segregated funds (PACs) established by corporations to participate in political
elections may only solicit contributions from "stockholders and their families and [the
corporation's] executive or administrative personnel and their families." 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (cited in Nat'l Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 202). PACs established by
unions may solicit contributions only from "[the umon's] members and their families."
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii). The provision continues by stating: "[t]his paragraph shall
not prevent a
corporation without capital stock, or a separate segregated fund
established by a
corporation without capital stock, from soliciting contributions to
such a fund from members.
" 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C) (cited in Nat'l Right to
Work, 459 U.S. at 202).
181 Nat'l Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 199-200.
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limiting its solicitation efforts to members, National Right to
Work's articles of incorporation expressly stated that it "shall
not have members" and its bylaws made no reference to members. 82 These and other factors convinced the Court that National Right to Work had violated the challenged regulation.
The Court concluded that membership requires "some relatively
enduring and independently significant financial or orgamzational attachment" to the corporation. 183 Merely responding to
"random mass mailings" soliciting funds is insufficient to estab14
lish membership .
Having concluded that National Right to Work violated the
regulation, the Court considered whether the limitation was constitutional. Obviously, restricting the permissible class of contributors to a PAC infringes its associational rights under the
first amendment.185 The Court of Appeals believed that this
raised "insurmountable constitutional difficulties."' 8 6 The concern was twofold: first, unrestricted solicitation of contributions
by corporate PACs does not threaten to create quid pro quo
relationships with candidates; and second, unrestricted solicitation does not threaten corporate coercion of contributions from
members holding minority political views. 87 The latter interest
distinguishes campaign finance regulations aimed at corporations
and unions from those aimed at individuals and noncorporate
associations.
In refusing to address the Court of Appeals' valid concerns,
the Supreme Court further delineated the constitutional parameters for permissible campaign finance regulations established
in Buckley and its progeny- political activities imtiated by corporations, unions, and similar socioeconomic institutions are
subject to more intrusive restrictions than those imtiated by other
political participants. 88 Underlying the Court's willingness to
approve prophylactic restrictions is its acceptance of the long-

112Id.

at 199.

M3Id. at 204.
"8

Id.

Id. at 206-07
Id. at 206.
19 Id.
"I Id. at 210-11.
"

'"
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established congressional determination that corporations and
unions pose a substantial threat to political processes. 8 9 Thus,
when regulations focus on corporations and unions, the Court
held that it would not "second-guess a legislative determination
as to the need for prophylactic measures when corruption is the
evil feared.' 19
The Supreme Court's holding in Nat'l Right to Work allows
the state considerable leeway in regulating PACs affiliated with
corporations and unions, but the holding in Bellotti indicates
that the State's discretion is not absolute. In Bellotti, the Court
refused to permit restrictions on corporate speech on the grounds
that corporations are entitled to less first amendment protection
than individuals. 191 Instead, the Court focused its first amendment analysis on the content of corporate speech which the State
sought to regulate and on preserving free access to the marketplace of ideas.192 To justify restrictions on speech, including
corporate speech, the State must satisfy, "the exacting scrutiny
necessitated by state-imposed restnction on freedom of speech."' 93
Nat'l Right to Work reveals that the Court gives deference to
the State's determination that it has a compelling interest in
regulating corporate and union political activities, but Bellotti
clearly indicates that the State cannot justify its regulations on
the basis of the speaker's identity alone. 94
The Court's most recent decisions on regulating PACs, Fed.
Election Comm'n v Nat'l Conservative PoliticalAction Comm.
(NCPAC) 95 and Fed. Election Comm'n v Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.,196 reveal its unwillingness to permit limitations on independent expenditures. In NCPAC, the Court struck

,,9 Id. at 208-09.
'90Id.

at 210.

191Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777
191Discussion of governmental affairs "is at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection," therefore, the State may not restrict the public's right to information on
matters of public concern solely upon the speaker's identity, "whether corporation,
association, umon, or individual." Id. at 776-77.
" Id. at 786.
194Id. at 777 (The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, umon, or individual.). Id.
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
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down a $1,000 limit on independent expenditures by PACs in
publicly funded elections (i.e., presidential elections). 197 The Court
reaffirmed its position in Buckley that independent expenditures
"produced speech at the core of the First Amendment" and that
they do not pose a threat of corrupting political processes. 19
Although NCPAC was formally incorporated, the Court refused
to follow Natl Right to Work to allow prophylactic measures
against the threat of undue corporate influence. The basis for
its decision was that NCPAC is not a "corporations" case,
because the challenged provision "applies not just to corporations but to any 'committee, association, or organization (whether
or not incorporated)' that accepts contributions or makes expenditures in connection with electoral campaigns."' 199 The Court
left open the question "whether a corporation can constitutionally be restricted in making independent expenditures to influ' '2
ence elections for public office. 00
In Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, the FEC filed a complaint
charging that Massachusetts Citizens for Life (Massachusetts
Citizens) violated the FECA's prohibition on using direct corporate expenditures in connection with elections to public office. 201 Massachusetts Citizens is a nonprofit, nonstock
corporation formed to advocate right to life principles. 2 2 It
published a newsletter which identified candidates for state and
federal offices who support its cause. 20 3 The Court concluded
that this was an expenditure prohibited by the FECA, because
it satisfied the express advocacy test set forth in Buckley 204

I" The provision invalidated in NCPAC was part of the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act, which provides partial public financing for presidential candidates
of major political parties who qualify for it. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 482; 26 U.S.C. §§

9001-9013 (1982).
'9, NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493, 497-98. The Court would have reached the same
result even if evidence of corruption was found, because it found the challenged provision
fatally overbroad. Id. at 498. The Court upheld the District Court's refusal to admit
compelling evidence that the expenditures were not independent. Id. at 499.
I" Id. at 496.
1w Id. The Court left this question open in Bellotti also. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
788 n.26.
10, Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. at 621; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b

(1982).
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 623.
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Consequently, the Court held that Massachusetts Citizens did
20 5
violate the statute.
Massachusetts Citizens could have established a PAC through
which to make campaign expenditures, as do similar corporations. 20 Nonetheless, the Court held that imposing the orgamzational requirements necessary to establish a PAC significantly
27
burdens Massachusetts Citizens' first amendment freedoms. 0
Since this is a "corporations case ' 208 the holding of Nat'l Right
to Work suggests that the Court should defer to Congress'
determination that the threat of corruption was sufficient to
justify restraints on free speech and association. 209 Yet the Court
considered one distinguishing factor significant in its refusal to
follow Natl Right to Work. Consistent with the teachings of
Buckley and the cases following it, the Court emphasized that
Congress was attempting to limit independent expenditures, not
contributions. 210 The Court indicated that this factor weighed
against giving the deference to Congress shown in Nat'l Right
to Work. As the Court stated:
We have consistently held that restnctions on contributions
require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.
In light of the historical role of contributions in the corruption of the electoral process, the need for a broad prophylactic rule was thus sufficient in National Right to Work
Committee to support a limitation on the ability of a committee to raise money for direct contributions to candidates. The
limitation on solicitation in this case, however, means that
non-member corporations can hardly raise any funds at all to
engage in political speech warranting the highest constitutional
protection. Regulation that would produce such a result demands far more precision than § 441b provides. Therefore, the

21 Id. at 624.
1 Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625-26; id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurnng).
10 Chief Justice Rehnquist used this term in NCPAC to distinguish it from Nat'l
Right to Work, 470 U.S. at 496.
20 This is the basis for Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, 107 S. Ct. at 632 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 629.
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desirability of a broad prophylactic rule cannot justify treating
alike business corporations and appellee in the regulation of
21
independent spending. '
After deciding that issue, the Court had to determine whether
Massachusetts Citizens posed the same threat of corruption traditionally ascribed to corporations.
After examining "the concerns underlying the regulation of
corporate political activity," the Court concluded that Massachusetts Citizens does not merely present "less of a threat of
the danger that has prompted regulation.
[I]t does not pose
such a threat at all." ' 212 The Court identified three features of
Massachusetts Citizens which negate any threat of corruption
considered inherent in corporate orgamzations. 213 "First, it was
formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and
cannot engage in business activities." ' 2 4 Therefore, any assets
received by Massachusetts Citizens are derived from its political
support in the community, not from "the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. 21 5 "Second, it has
no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim
on its assets or earnings. "216 This feature of Massachusetts Citizens ensures that its political activities will not infringe on
"minority" shareholders. People join this type of organization
because of its political message, not to realize a personal economic benefit. Should members become dissatisfied with Massachusetts Citizens' message or activities, they can simply quit
contributing to it. 217 "Third, [Massachusetts Citizens] was not
established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is
its policy not to accept contributions from such entities." 21 This
feature distinguishes Massachusetts Citizens from National Right
to Work, which aggressively pursued contributions from business
organizations. 21 9 Massachusetts Citizens' policy of disassociation

211

Id.

211 Id.

at 630.
Id. at 631.
234 Id. (emphasis in original).
2I Id. at 628.
236 Id. at 631 (emphasis in original).
237 Id. at 629.
238Id. at 631 (emphasis in original).
23

219Nat'l Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 200.
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with corporations and unions ensured that they could not use
organizations like Massachusetts Citizens "as conduits for the
type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political
market place." 220
Although the Court n9ted that the decision in Massachusetts
Citizens for Life might affect only a small class of political
organizations, 221 its significance extends beyond its immediate
impact on organizations like Massachusetts Citizens. By refusing
to follow Nat'l Right to Work, the Court has established that
Congress and the states cannot impose restrictions on voluntary
political associations merely because they don corporate form.
Therefore, requiring a corporation, or other organization formed
to operate in the marketplace of ideas, to make political contributions and expenditures (particularly expenditures) through
PACs is constitutional only if the corporation poses the same
threat posed by corporations organized to operate in the economic marketplace.
C. Kentucky Cases
Several cases, state and federal, have involved challenges to
Kentucky's campaign finance laws. In Lee v Commonwealth,m
the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered a challenge to section
121.045 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. This section, among
other things, prohibited contributions to candidates running for
Property Valuation Administrator (PVA) from property owners
in the county where the candidate was running.223 Although the
court quoted Buckley extensively and found that the provision
served no compelling state interest, it based its decision that the
provision is unconstitutional on Section 59 of the Constitution
of Kentucky 2 The court's failure to base its decision on the
free speech provisions of the state or federal constitutions is

I" Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. at 631.
=' Id.
565 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. App. 1978).
2_ KRS § 121.045 (Baldwin 1986).
21
Lee, 565 S.W.2d at 637-38. Section 59, subsection 29, of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits the enactment of a special law where a general law could be made
applicable. Ky. CONST. § 59(29).
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inexplicable, but the case is noteworthy nonetheless. In its discussion of the Corrupt Practices Act and its similarity to FECA,
the court suggested that Kentucky had an interest in equalizing
"the relative ability of all voters to affect the outcome of elections."2' 1 The court erroneously cited Buckley as support for
this assertion. In fact, the Supreme Court rejected this interest
in clear, unequivocal language .2 6 This error did not affect the
outcome of the case, but it deserves acknowledgment to prevent
misinterpretation of the principles established in Buckley
In Ky Registry of Election Finance v Louisville BarAss'n, 2 7
the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's decision
that the Louisville Bar Association, a nonprofit corporation,
could use its funds to purchase an advertisement contaimng its
judicial qualification poll. The trial court held that publishing
the poll did not violate the corrupt practices provision in the
Kentucky Constitution or statutes as long as it met certain conditions set by the court. 8 The appeals court refused to find this
holding clearly erroneous, but proceeded to the constitutional
question anyway 29 Therefore, its constitutional analysis seems
to be pure dicta. The analysis anticipates the holding of Massachusetts Citizens for Life. The Court of Appeals concluded
that even though the Louisville Bar Association was a corporation and could have established a PAC to make its expenditure
for the advertisement, prohibiting the expenditure violated first

21

Lee, 565 S.W.2d at 637.

n6 The Court's rejection of this interest finds its most succinct expression in the

following passage:
But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources,' " and" 'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.' "
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (citations omitted). This passage has generated considerable
controversy. Compare Wright, supra note 32 at 612, 631-42 ("IT]he truth-producing
capacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if some are allowed to monopolize
the marketplace by wielding excessive financial resources." Id. at 636) with BeVier,
supra note 133 at 1045, 1090 (agreeing with the Supreme Court's refusal in Buckley to
relax first amendment protections to achieve political equality).
579 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. App. 1979).
2 Id. at 624-25.
22

Id. at 625.
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amendment guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. 0
With reasoning similar to that found in Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, the Court of Appeals held that the Louisville Bar
Association was not the type of organization which poses an
unwarranted threat of corrupting the political process.Y' Since
Lee preceded Massachusetts Citizensfor Life and Nat'l Right to
Work, future cases in Kentucky must consider the constitutional
guidelines established in those decisions when determining whether
restrictions upon corporations like the Bar Association are exempt from the constitutional and statutory corrupt practices
provisions.
The two most recent cases involving challenges to Kentucky's
campaign finance laws were issued by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In Ky Educators Pub. Affairs Council v Ky
Registry of Election Finance,23 2 the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Educators' Public Affairs
Council (KEPAC). KEPAC is the PAC for the Kentucky Education Association (KEA). 233 Under Kentucky law KEA members
can request that their employers deduct KEA dues from their
pay 234 In conjunction with this system, KEPAC employs a "reverse check-off" procedure whereby it collects contributions from
KEA members. 2 5 To decline to contribute to KEPAC, KEA
members must affirmatively indicate their decision when com-

Id. at 627-28.

2
231

The Court of Appeals stated:

The purpose of both the constitutional and statutory provisions appear
[sic] to be for the prevention of the exertion of unwarranted and perhaps
unwholesome influence over political affairs by corporations formed for
profit. These corporations often have at their disposal large sums of money
capable of being used to further corporate fortunes through promoting the
aspirations of selected candidates. The activities of the Louisville Bar

Association in this case clearly do not fall within the conduct sought to be
avoided by our laws. There has been no corruption of candidates or vote
buying by corporate contributions, and we cannot see any need for protection of the individual members of the Bar Association in this situation.
Id. at 627.
=2 677 F.2d 1125 (6th Cir. 1982).
23 KEA is a non-profit corporation formed as an employee organization for teachers and other members of the educational community. Id. at 1127.
Id., KRS § 161.158(2) (Baldwin 1986).
21
677 F.2d at 1127.
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pleting the forms necessary to have KEA dues deducted. 23 6 KEA
members "can stop the deductions and can obtain a refund for
past contributions" should they desire.23 7 The court noted that
implementation of the reverse check-off system in 1975 resulted
to KEin a substantial increase in the number of contributors
23 8
PAC and in the amount of money it collected.
The basis for the Sixth Circuit's decision that KEPAC's
reverse check-off system is permissible is that it "meets the
'Knowing Free-Service Donation' test set forth in [Pipefitters
Local Union No. 562 v United States]. ' 23 9 Noting the "safeguards that protect the dissenting member,"0 the court concluded that "the KEPAC procedure amply protects the rights of
dissenters and meets tests of Pipefitters.'' Although the court
held that KEPAC could use the reverse check-off system under
Kentucky law, it also concluded that "KEPAC has no constitutional right to a check-off or payroll deduction system for
political fund raising. ' ' 2 2 Therefore, the Kentucky legislature
can, if it believes appropriate, modify or eliminate the procedure
altogether.
The final case considered in this section involves the Registry's role in enforcing campaign finance laws. In Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v Moulton,43 the Sixth Circuit held that
Kentucky's campaign finance laws do not vest exclusive control
over investigation of campaign finance violations with the Registry "to the exclusion of the Kentucky State Police or the
"
Furthermore, the court conCommonwealth attorneys.

23 Failure to indicate a desire not to contribute to KEPAC results in automatic
deduction of these contributions. Id. at 1127-28.
"7 Id.
23' Id.
29 Id. at 1132 (citing Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S.

385 (1972)).
uo Id.
14, Id. at 1133.
22 Id. at 1134 (citing City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,
426 U.S. 283 (1976)).
-3 773 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986). This case
includes a good discussion of the history of campaign finance legislation in Kentucky.
Id. at 697-99.
2" Id. at 700. The court stated that "[tihe statutory scheme shows only a desire to
supplement the traditional authority by increasing the powers and responsibility of the
Registry, not to replace the authority of others." Id.
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cluded that even assuming the statute vests exclusive control of
investigations in Registry, the court did "not believe the Kentucky legislature created an identifiable and protected liberty
interest of such proportions as to entitle it to protection as a
matter of federal constitutional law "24 This ruling gives the
Registry leeway in deciding the extent of its involvement in
investigation and enforcing campaign finance laws pursuant to

its statutory authority

246

The holding in Moulton must be considered in light of the
enactment of Kentucky's election reform legislation in 1988. The
legislature created two new sections to Chapter 15 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. This legislation defines and expands the
Attorney General's authority to investigate and enforce violations of election laws. 247 As a result, the Registry's role in
enforcing campaign finance laws is now better defined. Once an
investigation reaches the stage that probable cause exists, the
Registry's role effectively ceases. The Registry only pursues an
investigation beyond the probable cause determination if the
Attorney General has failed to prosecute the case properly 24
IV

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Having examined how PACs operate in the Commonwealth,
the campaign finance laws applicable to them, and the constitutional limits on permissible regulations, this Note suggests
several proposals for modifying the present campaign finance
regulatory scheme. These proposals address the problems likely
to arise from attempts to circumvent the new restraints on PAC
activities, yet remain within the constitutional framework established by Buckley and its progeny Obviously, the following
proposals are not the only ways to regulate PAC activities, but
they serve as a starting point for future legislative action.
A.

Limits on PAC Contributions to Candidates

Placing limits on contributions by PACs to political candidates was an obvious suggestion for reform that the Legislature

2A5 Id.
246
24

See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
S.B. 268 §§ I & 2, pp. 1-3.

m S.B. 268 § 2(2), pp. 1-2.
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accepted with overwhelming approval. 249 Contribution limits are
clearly constitutional, and they go to the heart of the quid pro
quo relationship considered a threat to the integrity of political
processes. 250 Given the logical assumption that PAC contributions have at least as much potential for corruption as contributions by individuals, arguments against imposing limits on
PAC contributions are difficult to sustain. Common Cause, a
supporter of imposing limits on PAC contributions, offers results from a recent exit poll to bolster its claim that Kentuckians
favored limits on PAC contributions. 25i The poll revealed that
approximately 64% of the respondents supported placing limits
on PACs. 25 2 This kind of evidence and the basic equities implicated suggest that of all the newly enacted reforms to current
campaign finance laws, limiting PAC contributions to candidates
was the most sensible approach for the Legislature to take.
Once legislative limits on PAC contributions take effect,
PACs may search for ways to circumvent the law The problem
is how to close the loopholes while ensuring fair, effective enforcement of contribution limits. Two sigmficant loopholes exist
in the 1988 regulatory scheme. First, PACs organized prior to
January 1, 1988, may surreptitiously create subsidiary PACs to

evade contribution limits.253 Second, those desiring to form new
PACs may evade contribution limits by forming a campaign
24
committee rather than a permament committee. 5
1. Subsidiary PA Cs
The original bill proposing limits on PAC contributions contained an amendment designed to prohibit PACs from creating
subsidiary PACs to carry out the purposes of the parent. This

14
Senate Bill 53, which limited PAC contributions to $4,000 per candidate per
election, passed the Senate 36-0 and passed the House 98-0. Legislative Record, Apr.
14, 1988 at p. 9.

2

25
252

See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
COMMON CAUsE/KENTUCKY, supra note 7 at 4.
Id. WHAS-TV, in Louisville, conducted the poll during the May 1987 primary

in Jefferson County. Of the respondents, 63.9% favored limits on PAC contributions;
16.1% opposed such limits.
-3
KRS § 121.150(7) (as amended by S.B. 268).
-' Campaign committees and permanent committees are included within the term
"committee" under Kentucky law. KRS § 121.015(3)(a), (c).
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amendment was withdrawn before the House voted on the measure. 255 Nonetheless, when the Legislature finally passed the Omnibus Election Reform Act in 1988, a provision prohibiting
creation of subsidiary PACs survived. 256 Despite the apparent
good intentions of the drafters, the provision enacted may prove
less effective than expected.
The subsidiary PACs prohibition is flawed in that the criteria
for establishing a relationship are too easy to avoid. PACs
"affiliated by bylaw structure or by registration, as determined
by the registry of election finance, shall be considered as one (1)
committee for purposes of applying the contribution limits of
subsection (6) of this section. ' 25 7 By focusing on mere paper
affiliations between PACs, the law allows compliance with its
technical requirements while ignoring its intent. Rather than
focusing on what PACs say they are, affiliations should be
determined by the day-to-day operations of the PACs involved.
Do they share contributors, employ the same political consultants, or have similar ties to the same candidate? 28 Obviously,
this type of inquiry is more difficult than a paper test, but it is
necessary to ensure effective enforcement of the prohibition
against the creation of subsidiary PACs.
Another aspect of the subsidiary PAC provision is the impact
of its grandfather clause on PACs registered as of January 1,
1988.259 The provision allows PACs and their affiliates existing
at that date to continue contributing to candidates as separate
organizations. 260 As a result, one of Kentucky's largest and most
visible contributors to state and local campaigns will still be able
to contribute more than $4,000 to candidates. KEPAC, without
creating a single new subsidiary, may potentially contribute
$146,000 to a single candidate in an election. It can do this by
simply changing its operating procedures so that the state committee and local PACs each contribute only $1,000 to the same
261
candidate.
'" See Legislative Record, S.B. 53, Apr. 14, 1988, at p. 9.
06 KRS § 121.150(7) (as amended by S.B. 268).
27 Id.
215 See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
25 Id.
'f
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
2
Id. With 146 PACs (the state organization plus 145 local orgamzations) contrib-
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Campaign Committees

Kentucky law defines a campaign committee as "one (1) or
more persons who receive contributions and make expenditures
to support or oppose one (1) or more specific candidates for
nomination or election to any state, county, city or district
office.
"262 The only distinguishing structural feature between
a campaign committee and a permanent committee established
to support selected candidates is that a permanent committee is
"established as, or intended to be, a permanent orgamzatlon
which functions on a regular basis throughout the
"1263
year
Campaign committees are available as vehicles for evading
contribution limits on PACs simply because the newly enacted
limit on PAC contributions does not apply to campaign committees. 26 Although campaign committees and permanent committees may be used in the same ways, campaign committees
may give unlimited contributions to candidates. Essentially, campaign committees may be established as short-lived PACs.
Campaign committees may be treated differently than PACs
solely on the assumption that they are agents for a particular
candidate or candidates and therefore subject to the same regulations as candidates. Perhaps the Legislature made this assumption when it excluded campaign contributions from
quantitative limits. If this is the case, the Legislature seems to
have operated under a misconception. No where in Kentucky's
campaign finance regulations is there a requirement that campaign committees be affiliated with a candidate or acting for a
candidate. The only provision governing unauthorized or disavowed campaign committees merely prohibits them from using

uting $1,000 apiece, a candidate may still receive $146,000 from KEPAC. The author
does not intend to imply that KEPAC created its subsidiary PACs to circumvent
contribution limits. KEPAC created its affiliates in 1977-78, well before attention was
focused on Kentucky PAC activities. See J. Graves, supra note 34, at 2.
KRS § 121.015(3)(a) (Baldwin 1986).
Id. at § 121.015(3)(c).
I" Id. at § 121.150(6) (as amended by S.B. 268). Campaign committees are also
not subject to subsidiary PAC regulations, nor to the provision limiting aggregate
individual contributions to PACs to $4,000 per year. Id. at § 121.150(7), (9) (as amended
by S.B. 268).
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the candidate's name and directs them to the provisions prescribing their reporting and filing requirements. 261 Obviously, cam-

paign committees that operate like permanent committees (PACs),
particularly those affiliated with a specific interest group, should
be subject to the same contribution limits and other restraints
applicable to PACs.
B.

Limits on Independent Expenditures

Quantitative limits on independent expenditures are constitutionally impermissible unless the legislature can establish that

they pose a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption
to the political system. 26 In Kentucky, the problems which many

commentators attribute to independent expenditures have been
nonexistent. However, since Kentucky now limits PAC contri-

butions as well as individual contributions, PACs have an incentive to make independent expenditures. They can no longer get

more "bang" for their "bucks" with direct contributions. The
legislature should realize that imposing limits on PAC contri-

butions will bring about an increase in the amounts spent on
independent expenditures. This has already happened at the na267
tional level.
Although limits on independent expenditures are unconsti-

tutional, other ways exist to control them. One recurring cnticism of independent expenditures is that they are not truly
independent.261 When PACs coordinate their "independent" expenditures with the candidate or the campaign staff, they are

actually making a contribution in kind to the candidate. 26 9 To

Id. at § 121.210(4) (Baldwin 1986).
See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
16 See L. SAATo,
supra note 14, at 174-75; Jacobson, Money in the 1980 and
1982 CongressionalElections in MoNEY AND PoLMcs IN T UNfMD STATEs: FNtcnIG
ELEcTiONS iN TnE 1980s, at 51-55 (M. Malbin ed. 1984); Comment, supra note 122, at
674.
2,
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 122, at 675-76. The author notes that: "[a]lthough
the expenditures may legally be classified as independent, candidates often establish
extensive commumcations with the independent committee through the media and personal contacts. Some independent committees recruit candidates and persuade them to
enter the race." Id. at 675. As an example of this problem, the author cited extensive
connections between NCPAC and the Reagan campaign in 1980. Id. at 675 n.15.
29 Comment, supra note 122, at 687.
26
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ensure that independent expenditures are not coordinated with
the candidate's campaign, the legislature should identify a series
of factors which will raise a rebuttable presumption that an
expenditure is actually a contribution in kind. For instance, when
PAC officers also hold positions in the candidate's campaign, a
presumption of coordination is reasonable. 270 Another factor
tending to show coordination of efforts is the sharing of numerous common vendors. 271 If a PAC chooses to employ the
same advertising agency or political consultant, coordination
272
appears probable.
Another criticism of independent expenditures is that PACs
cannot be held accountable for their actions. This criticism arose
in 1980, after NCPAC funded high profile negative campaigns
targeting certain members of Congress NCPAC considered too
liberal. 273 As NCPAC's controversial founder, Terry Dolan, admitted, NCPAC can "lie through its teeth" about a targeted
candidate, leaving that candidate's opponent free to disclaim any
involvement in NCPAC's smear campaign.2 74 To ensure that the
public at least knows who or what organizations are responsible
for slinging political mud, the legislature should require political
advertisements funded by PAC expenditures to expressly, and
audibly if on radio or television, state the name of the PAC
that purchased the advertisement and the name of the candidate
-for whose benefit it purchased the advertisement. This way,
candidates who benefit from the negative tactics employed must

270 For a discussion of the criteria which the FEC should use to determine if

nominally independent expenditures are actually contributions in kind, see id. at 694-97.
271Id.
127Id.

at 697.
at 696.

"I See Jacobson, supra note 267, at 51-55. NCPAC spent approximately $1.2
million for media campaigns attacking a select group of liberal Democratic incumbents

in Congress. Id. at 54.
Dolan stated in an interview:
Groups like ours are potentially dangerous to the political process. We
could be a menace, yes. Independent expenditure groups, for example,
could amass this great amount of money and defeat the point of accountability in politics. A group like ours could lie through its teeth and the
candidate it helps stays clean.
See Comment, supra note 122, at 676-77 n.21 (quoting MacPherson, The New Right
Brigade, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1980, at F-i, col. 1).
v4
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either embrace or denounce them. This is arguably a harsh rule,
because candidates cannot always control the actions of their
supporters. Even accepting this, candidates should not be allowed to accept the benefits of negative campaigns while accepting no responsibility for their content.
C. Reporting Requirements
Kentucky has comprehensive disclosure requirements now,
but one change suggested by Common Cause would prove beneficial. The legislature needs to increase the staff and enforcement authority of the Registry The current staff is competent
and hard-working, but it cannot perform its basic administrative
functions and thoroughly check for attempts to circumvent the

law
D.

275

Enforcement

Currently, primary responsibility for enforcing campaign finance laws rests within the attorney general's office. This may
prove troublesome should a future attorney general show more
interest in personal, political concerns than in faithfully executing election laws. For this reason, a strong, independent Registry
is arguably the best vehicle for enforcing laws inextricably intertwined with political careers and ambitions.
E.

Public Financing

Although adoption of partial or full public financing for
gubernatorial or legislative races does not target PACs in particular, supporters of public financing argue that it would go to
the root of the fundamental problems with our current system
of campaign financing. 276 In a system that operates on private

171

See CoMAoN CAUSE/KENTUCKY, supra note 7, at 4.

276

Id. See generally Adamany, supra note 122, at 1022-23, 1027 (supporting public

financing of congressional elections but also discussing drawbacks); Fleishman and
McConkle, Level-Up Rather than Level-Down: Toward a New Theory of Campaign
FinanceReform, I J. L. & POL. 211, 275 (1984) (incorporating partial public financing
in sophisticated theoretical construct of campaign financing); Girard, Campaign Finance
Reform in California, 10 HASTiNGs CONST. L.Q. 567, 585 (1983) ("Direct funding of
campaign expenditures from the public treasury is a superior alternative to the present
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voluntary campaign contributions, the creation of political debts
is inevitable. In such a system wealthy candidates will always
have a decided advantage over nonwealthy candidates. Public
financing would eliminate or reduce the creation of political
debts, depending on whether full or partial funding is available,
and it would ensure that nonwealthy candidates can afford the
financial burdens imposed by effective political campaigns.
Several states have adopted public financing mechamsms for
particular elections and have proven that public financing can
work at the state level. 277 Yet the prospect that Kentucky's legislature will adopt such a system appears dim. The Common-

wealth already faces serious financial problems, and Kentuckians
clearly expressed their opposition to tax increases in the upset

victory of Wallace Wilkinson in the 1987 pnmary Since raising
the funds necessary to sustain a public financing system would

pose another financial dilemma for the legislature, its adoption
in the near future appears unlikely This is unfortunate because
the long-term benefits of such a system might outweigh its
costs.

278

CONCLUSION

PACs have not realized their full potential for influencing
elections in the Commonwealth, but the preliminary studies reveal that they are having an increasing impact on political campaigns. In particular, PACs supply a large proportion of the
funds contributed to legislative campaigns. Even assuming that

methods of financing campaigns."); Rich, Campaign FinanceLegislation: Equality and
Freedom, 20 CoLum. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 409, 433-35 (1986) (stating that public financing
has advantages, but noting that the decision of who gets money is an insurmountable
problem).
rn New Jersey is the best example of a state that has adopted a successful public
financing system. See Edelman, A Reform Worth Reforming: Campaign Financein New
Jersey, 74 NAT'L Crvic REv. 417 (1985) (noting that system has been successful but
needs more work).
211The Executive Director of Common Cause in Kentucky, Alane Goldstein, argues
persuasively that Kentuckians cannot afford not to adopt a public financing system for
political campaigns. She maintains that adoption of public financing would save the
Commonwealth money in the long-term by eliminating the waste inherent in the creation
of political campaign debts to particular individuals and interest groups. Telephone
interview with Alane Goldstein, Executive Director of Common Cause in Kentucky (Oct.
27, 1987).
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candidates for legislative seats do not compromise their integrity
to obtain PAC contributions, the appearance of corruption persists. 279 Although PAC contributions compose a small percentage
of total contributions to gubernatorial candidates, PAC contributions have in several instances far exceeded the $4,000 limit
on individual contributions. 2 0 With the recent enactment of
legislation limiting PAC contributions to $4,000 the Legislature
took a significant step toward lessening the appearance of corruption created by large PAC contributions.
Although Kentucky has witnessed a recent upsurge of interest
in campaign finance reform, much work remains undone. The
1988 legislation regulating PACs is a hopeful first step, but too
many gaping loopholes exist. To make contribution limits on
PACs mean anything, the Legislature must be ready to address
potential abusers of the system by subsidiary PACs and campaign committees. The Legislature should also consider enacting
regulations to prevent PACs from circumventing contribution
limits by disguising contributions as independent expenditures.
Finally, to ensure vigorous enforcement of the regulatory system,
the Legislature should increase the enforcement authority and
resources of the Registry
Above all else, the Legislature must recognize the impact
that Buckley v Valeo 2s' and its progeny have on any type of
campaign finance reform. 28 2 This Note argues that compelling
reasons exist for regulating PAC activities but enacting contribution limits or more reporting requirements will not reduce the
advantage wealthy candidates have over nonwealthy candidates.
Imposing restraints on PACs will not, in all likelihood, reduce
the much cnticized cost of political campaigns. The only way to
address these problems without violating the first amendment is
to adopt partial or full public financing of political campaigns.
Whether Kentuckians will recognize the long-term benefits of

See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
For example, KEPAC contributed $35,000 to Republican John Harper in the
1987 general election for governor. See Teacher Group Marks $35,000 for Harper Use,
Lexington Herald-Leader, Sept. 28, 1987, at B2, col. 1.
27
2

28

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

See supra notes 130-221 and accompanying text.
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such a change remains to be seen: until that time, the Legislature
must confront the problems presented by PACs.
John W Hays

